Opinions Archive

The new-interpretation-of-federal-or-state-law exception to the two-year time bar set forth in Minnesota Statutes section 590.01, subdivision 4(b)(3) (2024), does not apply to appellant’s claims for postconviction relief. Affirmed. Considered and decided by the court without oral argument.

Disbarment is warranted where respondent misappropriated more than $94,000 from her employer while suspended for having previously misappropriated client funds. Disbarred.

1. A performing construction surety need not show any mistake of fact to exercise its right of equitable subrogation. 2. A surety’s right to equitable subrogation is not a security interest subject to the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), Minn. Stat. §§ 336.9-101 to 336.9-809 (2022), and the UCC’s first-in-time priority rule. Instead, through the doctrine of equitable subrogation, a performing surety has priority over a secured creditor as to contract funds created by the surety’s performance on its bond obligations. Reversed and remanded.

1. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the compensation judge’s finding that the employee has a compensable mental injury because that finding is not manifestly contrary to the evidence, which included testimony by a licensed professional psychologist that, based on the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, the employee has a present diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 2. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals erred in addressing the employee’s argument that he was entitled to compensation benefits for a diagnosis of other specified trauma and stressor-related disorder (OSTD) as a consequential mental injury of PTSD because that issue was moot given the record here, where the employee’s expert psychologist opined that the employee’s OSTD diagnosis was “subthreshold PTSD” and the Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals decided that the employee is entitled to compensation benefits for a present diagnosis of PTSD. 3. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the compensation judge’s award of a penalty for frivolous denial of primary liability. Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

1. The Minnesota Free Flow of Information Act does not contain an exception—beyond the statutory exceptions contained in Minn. Stat. §§ 595.024–.025 (2024)—for newsgatherers who allegedly engage in unlawful or tortious conduct of the kind presented in this case. 2. The Minnesota Free Flow of Information Act does not prohibit the district court from ordering production of a privilege log. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the district court.

1. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s petition for postconviction relief as to his equal protection claim. 2. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s petition for postconviction relief as to his claims of entrapment, trial counsel’s disregard of his “defense objective of choice,” and witness tampering. Affirmed. Considered and decided by the court without oral argument.

A person commits felony tax evasion under Minn. Stat. § 289A.63, subd. 1 (2018), if they (1) had an obligation to file a tax return or pay taxes due, (2) did not satisfy their tax obligation, and (3) failed to do so with the purpose to evade or defeat their tax obligation. The state does not need to prove an additional evasive act. Reversed and remanded.

To determine whether a law-enforcement officer’s hot pursuit of a suspected misdemeanant presents exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless entry into a home, a court must consider, on a case-by-case basis in light of the totality of the circumstances, the nature of the crime, the nature of the flight, and the surrounding facts. Affirmed.

We affirm appellant’s conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm because (1) the district court properly denied appellant’s motion to suppress evidence of a firearm found in his house, (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary rulings during trial, (3) there was sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant possessed the firearm, and (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s petition for postconviction relief.

Appellant challenges the revocation of his probation, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by failing to make adequate findings pursuant to the third Austin factor. We affirm.